#### STATE OF CALIFORNIA

### DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

DECISION ON ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

IN RE: PUBLIC WORKS CASE NO. 99-032

SAN DIEGO CITY SCHOOLS

CONSTRUCTION OF PORTABLE CLASSROOMS

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## I. Introduction and Procedural History

On November 10, 1999, in response to a request by Arthur S. Lujan, then Business Manager, Building and Construction Trades Council, San Diego County ("Council"), the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations ("Director") issued a public works coverage determination finding the construction of portable classrooms by Echo Pacific Construction ("Echo") for the San Diego Unified School District ("District") to be a public work under the California prevailing wage law. On January 5, 2000, the District filed a late appeal of the Director's determination. That appeal was not properly served on other interested parties as required by Title 8 California Code of Regulations ("CCR") section 16002.5. On January 27, 2000, the Department of Industrial Relations, Office of the Director Legal Unit, served the Council with a copy of the appeal, advised the District that it had made such service and invited the Council to file a response. As of this date, the Council has not made a further submission. The Carpenters Contractors Cooperation Committee

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("CCCC"), as an interested party under 8 CCR section 16000, submitted written argument in favor of the Director's determination.

# II. Issues and Conclusions on Appeal

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The District contends that the initial determination was incorrect for two reasons. First, it asserts that the Department's reliance on the decision in O.G. Sansone v.

Department of Transportation (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 434, 127

Cal.Rptr.799, is misplaced because the central issue in this case is whether the project is a public work. Second, the District argues that, under the reasoning of Steelgard, Inc. v. Jannsen (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 79, 217 Cal.Rptr.152, the purchase of portable classrooms is the procurement of materials or supplies and not a public works project for construction, alteration, demolition or repair work. In its submission, the CCCC asserts that the appeal should be dismissed both because of the District's failure to timely file its appeal and because it fails to state the full factual and legal grounds upon which the determination is appealed.

After a review of the District's appeal and the CCCC's argument, the Director entertains the appeal because it involves an important policy issue related to the interpretation of the Labor Code in the context of the facts of this case. I find that the District has entered into a public works contract for the construction of portable classrooms and that its contractors and

their subcontractors, if any, are obligated to pay their workers the appropriate prevailing wage.

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Echo is the successor in interest to D.M. Erickson Construction Company.

## III. Relevant Facts

The following facts concerning the project appear to be undisputed by the parties to this appeal. The District entered into a contract with D. M. Erickson Construction Company for the construction and delivery of 200 portable classrooms. The contract specifically requires that the contractor provide "all labor, materials, tools, equipment and services including necessary tools, expendable equipment, and all utility and transportation services required to complete in a workman-like manner all the work required in connection with the project known as 'Construction of Portable Contract No. 79'." The contract price for the purchase of the 200 portable classrooms is \$1,224,000. Echo is performing the construction of the portable classrooms, which are not prefabricated at a permanent factory site. The portable classrooms are being assembled on privatelyowned land leased by Echo as a construction and storage yard for the portable classrooms as they are prepared for delivery to the District. According to District personnel, the District has a contract with an outside vendor to move the portable classrooms from the yard used by Echo to the various school locations where

the portable classrooms are sited.<sup>2</sup> The classrooms are delivered to various school sites throughout the District where they are installed by District personnel who do the final hook-up work for the HVAC, electrical, and plumbing systems to put the classrooms into service.

The District filed a Notice of Completion ("Notice") on September 15, 1999, attesting that it had accepted the work of the contractor for the "construction of 200 portable classroom buildings (constructed at) stockpile location: 408 Hollister St., San Diego, California 92154." The Notice is for a public works project and is issued and recorded pursuant to the provisions of sections 3086, 3093, and 3184 of the California Civil Code. Item 5 of the Notice identifies the "original contractor" as Echo Pacific Construction, Inc. The Notice is signed by Thomas J. Calhoun, Director, Facilities Development Department, Business Services Division, San Diego Unified School District. It is notarized and has been officially accepted by the County Recorder's Office for the County of San Diego.

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While not a subject of the coverage request, it should be noted that anyone employed (other than District employees) to move the portable classrooms from the dedicated yard to the various school sites is also entitled to prevailing wages. See the discussion of Sansone, infra.

## IV. Discussion

1. The Appeal's Untimeliness and Service Irregularity Will Not Preclude a Determination on the Merits.

The initial determination was served on the interested parties on November 10, 1999. The District's appeal (or request for reconsideration) was served on the Director on January 5, 2000. Under 8 C.C.R. 16002.5, an appeal from a determination of the Director must be filed "within 30 days of the issuance of the coverage." It must be served on the awarding body and any other interested parties. In this case the District failed to file the appeal within 30 days and it did not serve the Council, which was sent a copy of the signed determination letter and which is clearly an interested party within the definition of that term contained in 8 Cal.Code Regs. 16000.

Clearly, the District did not serve its appeal within the 30-day requirement nor did it properly serve all parties. The Director's Legal Unit cured the service irregularity when it served Council with the appeal and provided it time within which to respond.

<sup>&#</sup>x27; Interested Party. When used with reference to a particular prevailing wage determination made by the Director, includes:

<sup>(1)</sup> Any contractor or subcontractor, or any organization, association, or other representative of any contractor or subcontractor likely to bid on or to perform a contract for public work which is subject to the particular prevailing wage determinations, and/or

<sup>(2)</sup> Any worker in the particular craft, classification, or type of work, who may be employed on a public work project subject to the particular prevailing wage determination, or any labor organization or other representative of such a person, including the recognized collective bargaining representative for the particular craft, classification, or type of work; and/or

<sup>(3)</sup> Any awarding body or association or other representative of awarding bodies concerned with the administration of a pubic works contract or proposed contract, which is subject to the particular prevailing wage determination.

In addition, 8 CCR 16002.5(b) requires that a notice of appeal of a public works coverage determination "shall state the full factual and legal grounds upon which the determination is appealed..." CCCC claims that the appeal fails to comport with this requirement. The appeal sets forth sufficient facts and legal arguments to allow the Director and the CCCC to comprehend the District's position. Generally, a court will not dismiss an appeal solely because it is procedurally deficient if there is sufficient information to determine the nature of the complaint and the requested relief and the deficiency may be readily cured. Drake v. Davis (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d Supp. 1000, 1003, 167 P.2d 560.

Finally, the initial determination addresses important policy issues interpreting provisions of the Labor Code as they apply to this project. For these reasons, the Director entertains the appeal.

2. The Construction of 200 Portable Classrooms at a Dedicated Yard Leased Solely for the Project is Construction Paid For With Public Funds Under 1720(a) and not the Purchase of Material or Supplies.

The general question presented is whether, under applicable statutory and case law, the workers of Echo are entitled to be paid prevailing wages on the project because they are employees of a contractor engaged in a public works project. The specific issue raised by this appeal is whether the construction of 200 portable classrooms on a specifically dedicated site amounts to a "public works" as that term is used in the Labor Code and whether

it is a "project" as that term is used in the Public Contracts Code section 10105, 4 or is merely the purchase of supplies or materials as those terms are used in Public Contracts Code section 101015 and, therefore, governed under Education Code sections 17785 et.seq. and 39190 et.seq.

The initial determination found that this case was governed by the reasoning in O.G. Sansone v. Department of Transportation (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 434, 127 Cal.Rptr.799. In Sansone, a trucking company hauled sub-base material to a state highway construction project from locations adjacent to and established exclusively for the highway project. The material was purchased by a third party subcontractor who then contracted with a trucking firm to haul the sub-base to the project. The material was dumped directly onto a roadbed, where workers on the project incorporated the material into the roadbed. The trucking company in Sansone was found to be a subcontractor for two principal First, the materials it delivered were acquired from reasons. third party locations adjacent to and established exclusively for the project site, and, second, the trucking company was hired by the prime contractor to perform an integral part of the prime contractor's obligations under the prime contract.

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Public Contract Code section 10105 states in relevant part: "As used in this part, "project" includes the erection, construction, alteration, repair or improvement of any state structure, building, road, or other state improvement of any kind."

Public Contract Code section 10101 states in relevant part: "Contracts for the purchase of supplies or materials which are purchased pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 10290), Part 2, Division 2, of the Public Contract Code, are not subject to this part, even though the seller is required to perform some incidental work or service in connection with the delivery of the material or supplies."

In analyzing whether the trucking company was a subcontractor, the Court adopted the United States Secretary of Labor's administrative interpretations of the Davis-Bacon Act's exclusion of material suppliers from statutory coverage. The Court set forth three principal criteria for the denomination of material supplier. First, a material supplier must be in the business of selling supplies to the general public. Second, the plant from which the material is obtained must not be established specially for the particular contract. Third, the plant may not be located at the site of the work.

In this case, it is undisputed that the employees are working for a general contractor hired to assemble the portable classrooms before they are moved to specific school sites for final installation by district personnel. They are not employees of a material supplier. It is also clear that the workers constructing the portable classrooms are working at a site leased by Echo solely for the assembly of the classrooms. Finally, it is undisputed that the leased site closed upon completion of the construction work. Therefore, under Sansone, the workers employed at the site dedicated to the construction of the portable classrooms are entitled to be paid prevailing wages.

The District contends that Steelgard supports the conclusion that its purchase of portable classrooms is simply the procurement of materials and supplies, and not a public works project. In Steelgard, the issue was whether the California Department of General Services had to competitively bid work in

implementing the Emergency School Classroom Law of 1979 ("ESCL")
under the State Contract Act or whether the acquisition of .
portable classrooms was covered under the ESCL's provisions for
the procurement of portable classrooms. In Steelgard, the
Department of General Services put out to bid a series of
portable classroom projects under the ESCL as the procurement of
materials or supplies, and not under the more formal bidding
requirements of the State Contract Act. A losing bidder filed a
writ of mandate seeking to have the Department of General
Services reopen bidding, contending that the contract should have
been competitively bid under the State Contract Act. The Court
observed that the State Contract Act is more burdensome and less
flexible than the ECSL's provisions. The Court also noted that,
unlike the standard construction contracts to which the State
Contract Act normally applies, the on-site work necessary to
install a portable classroom was approximately \$400-500 while the
total purchase price of each classroom was \$20,000. Id., pg. 89.
The Court reasoned that the installation of a portable classroom,
which it described as an impermanent structure, was only
incidental (as that term is used in Public Contract Code section
10101) to the purchase of a finished product, the portable
classroom. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed that
one of the reasons that the State Contract Act did not apply is
that the buildings were "prefabricated in factories," rather than
constructed on the site where they will be utilized. The Court
further stated that "only a small portion of the time, cost, and

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labor involves outside installation. By both the statutory definition and in reality, the buildings are easily relocatable, installed on wood rather than permanent foundations." <u>Id</u>., pg. 90.

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In contrast to the facts of Steelgard, evidence produced by the Council shows that the classrooms are actually constructed on the specifically dedicated site where there is a great deal of construction work because the buildings are assembled from the ground up. Further, the buildings are constructed by a licensed contractor and are not wholly manufactured at a permanent plant. This is exactly the situation discussed in Sansone, supra. work is done in the furtherance of a public works project and it takes place at a location site set up solely to service the public work. Indeed, the contract itself shows that the first and largest component listed under the scope of the work is the provision of all labor necessary to perform the construction. 6 While relying on Steelgard, supra, the District does not dispute that the actual construction takes place at a dedicated facility which is not the manufacturer's property and the buildings are not prefabricated in factories as in Steelgard. In addition, it is apparent that the construction here is not of the type discussed in Education Code section 39190 (now renumbered as section 17350) which defines "a 'factory-built school' building as any building designed or intended for use as a school building

The actual installation work is done by district personnel or force account workers who are permanent public employees and are not entitled to prevailing wages. Bishop v. San Jose (169) 1 Cal.3d 56, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465.

which is either wholly manufactured or in substantial part manufactured at an off-site location . . . to be assembled or erected on a school site." Quite the opposite is true here. The vast majority of the construction takes place at the dedicated yard facility where parts are delivered and assembled. This must be contrasted to the Steelgard case which, based on the evidence, found that only a very small portion of the contract price had to do with the installation of pre-manufactured classrooms. Here, there is certainly more than an incidental amount of work being performed to construct the classrooms and certainly more than an incidental percentage of the contract price is to pay for that construction.

Finally, it should be noted that Steelgard does not address the question whether the procurement of the classrooms was a public work. Rather, it addresses whether the project could be procured under the provisions of the Education and Government Codes related to the acquisition of portable school buildings rather than competitively bid under the more stringent requirements of the State Contract Act related to construction of public facilities. The Court found that, based on the particular facts of the case, the Department of General Services did not have to put the project out to bid under the State Contract Act.

(Id. at p. 91.) This is quite different than the issue presented by this appeal—whether the construction work is a public works.

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# V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, I deny the District's appeal and sustain the original determination that the work in question is a public works for which prevailing wages must be paid.

DATED: 6/23/00

Stephen J. Smith

Director